How does DRS work in Formula 1, and why doesn’t it guarantee an overtake?

DRS can be used when a driver is within one second of the car ahead at the detection point, increasing top speed on the straight. Whether that becomes a pass depends on straight length, braking zone severity, line options, and whether dirty air has already damaged the attacker’s tyres.

Why is overtaking still so difficult at Monaco even with rule changes?

Monaco’s narrow layout and short straights limit braking invitations and alternate racing lines, so speed delta often can’t be converted into a completed pass. Even the 2025 mandatory two-stop rule mainly changes strategy windows, not the circuit’s physical ability to support overtakes.

Which 2025 circuits were most “DRS-friendly” for overtaking?

Tracks with long straights into heavy braking zones tend to be the most DRS-friendly, as they convert speed delta into a credible move. In 2025, venues like Spain, Baku, Mexico and Las Vegas stood out in on-track pass count datasets.

How did removing the fastest lap bonus point from 2025 change race strategy?

Without a fastest lap bonus point, teams have less incentive to pit late for a soft-tyre flyer if it risks losing track position. Late-race decisions tilt more toward defending position or attacking on-track rather than chasing a single extra point.

How can I test how overtakes and position changes affect the championship?

Use RaceMate’s simulator to swap finishing positions, adjust hypothetical outcomes, and instantly see how points move. This is especially useful for tight seasons like 2025, where small position swings can change championship margins.

Overtaking in 2025: Where DRS Helped — and Where It Didn’t

There’s a moment in every 2025 overtake where you can feel the sport negotiating with itself.

Not the wheel-to-wheel highlight that gets clipped and replayed — the setup three laps earlier, when a driver chooses to spend battery now, protect tyres now, and accept dirty air now… because a specific straight, a specific braking zone, and a specific DRS timing line are about to offer something that most of the track never will. In 2025, overtaking wasn’t “easy” or “hard” in the abstract. It was track-shaped. And DRS didn’t change that — it just amplified whatever the circuit already believed about passing.

2025 in context: why overtakes mattered more than ever

The 2025 season ended with a reminder that in modern F1, you don’t need chaos to get a knife-edge championship — you just need scarcity. Lando Norris took the Drivers’ title on 423 points, Max Verstappen finished two points behind on 421, and Oscar Piastri ended on 410. Those margins weren’t built on one miracle Sunday; they were built on dozens of weekends where one pass turned into two points, and two points turned into a trophy.

McLaren’s second straight Constructors’ title (833 points) also framed the season’s overtaking story: when you’re consistently at the front, you often don’t need to overtake much — but you need your opponents to find it difficult to overtake you. Mercedes (469), Red Bull (451) and Ferrari (398) spent much of 2025 trying to turn pace into position on circuits that either rewarded that ambition… or punished it with DRS trains and narrow racing lines.

And the points context matters, too: from 2025 onward there is no fastest lap bonus point, which subtly changes late-race behaviour. The incentive is no longer “pit for softs and hunt the extra point” — it’s “protect track position, or steal it.” That single shift pushes strategy closer to what overtaking has always really been: a cost–benefit calculation under tyre degradation, traffic risk, and defensive geometry.

What DRS actually does (and what it can’t do)

DRS is often discussed like it’s a power-up, but in 2025 it behaved more like a multiplier. The rule is simple — be within one second at the detection point, open the flap in the zone — but the outcome depends on whether the circuit can convert a speed delta into a completed pass.

Here’s the practical bit teams model (and why RaceMate users feel it in strategy sims): DRS tends to produce overtakes when it can create a sustained closing rate and the car behind has a credible braking invitation at the end of the straight. That invitation can come from a heavy stop (classic dive territory), a wide entry with multiple lines, or a following corner sequence that rewards the attacker if the defender compromises the apex. When those ingredients aren’t there — when the straight is too short, the braking zone too shallow, or the next corner too single-file — DRS becomes a way to stay close, not a way to get through.

This is also where dirty air shows up as the invisible co-author of every pass. If you need the tyres to survive two laps of close following before the straight arrives, your “DRS chance” may already be dead. (If you want the deeper version of that tax, it pairs directly with our clean-air breakdown: Clean Air Is King: How Dirty Air Changes Strategy.)

Circuit archetypes in 2025: where DRS helped — and where it didn’t

Rather than ranking tracks as “good” or “bad,” it’s more useful to think in archetypes — because strategy planning starts with the kind of overtaking a circuit allows.

Archetype 1: DRS-forward circuits (stop–start, long straights, heavy braking)

These are the tracks where DRS doesn’t just keep you attached — it regularly turns “close enough” into “alongside.” They usually combine:

Long full-throttle sections that let DRS + ERS + slipstream stack together
Big braking events (and therefore late-brake line variety)
Traction-limited exits that punish defensive compromises

Using an on-track pass count methodology that excludes non-racing passes (like pit-cycle position changes) and typically removes Lap 1 reshuffles, several 2025 rounds consistently sat in the high-opportunity bracket — including Spain (55), Baku (47), Mexico (44) and Las Vegas (77). Bahrain landed in a more “steady” zone at 36.

Las Vegas is the interesting case study because it shows how definitions matter: one published event wrap-up described 37 overtakes on race night, while other datasets count substantially higher depending on what is included (and how lap-one and technical-position changes are treated).The strategic takeaway doesn’t change: Vegas is a draft-and-brake circuit. If you’re planning a race there, you’re planning around passing.

What it means for strategy: on DRS-forward tracks, the undercut is still powerful — but it’s not always the whole game. Track position is recoverable. That gives teams permission to pit earlier for tyre offset, even if it means rejoining behind a rival, because the circuit offers realistic “payback zones” later.

Archetype 2: DRS-neutral circuits (high-speed flow, position is earned, not gifted)

These are circuits where overtaking is possible, but rarely cheap. Think of tracks where corners are high-speed and connected, where following closely costs front tyres, and where a pass often requires both DRS and a meaningful tyre delta. In 2025, several of these venues still produced healthy on-track pass counts — Japan (48) and the Netherlands (43) are examples from season datasets — but many of those moves are midfield, offset-driven, or late-stint degradation moments rather than “DRS fly-bys.”

What makes this archetype strategically awkward is the timing problem: you might need two laps of proximity to manufacture one attempt, but those two laps might cost you the tyre life you need to complete it. The result is a style of racing where drivers often attack in bursts — back off to cool tyres, recharge battery, then commit when the next straight aligns with the next deployment window.

What it means for strategy: this is pit wall psychology territory. You’re not just asking “can we pass?” You’re asking “what does it cost to try?” It’s exactly why the pit stop window is so brutally decisive on these tracks — one rejoin into a DRS train can turn theoretical pace into permanent frustration. (If that sentence feels painfully familiar, it’s the core theme of The Pit Stop Window Explained.)

Archetype 3: DRS-resistant circuits (street, narrow, single-line, track position is everything)

This is where DRS stops being a multiplier and starts being a placebo.

Monaco remains the purest example: even with the 2025 mandatory two-stop rule (drivers required to use at least three tyre sets, and two different compounds in a dry race), overtaking was still minimal because the circuit doesn’t supply the fundamental geometry for it. Reports and datasets differ on the exact number depending on classification, but the story is the same — passes were exceptionally rare, including effectively none for meaningful top-10 position changes.

And that’s the key point: when overtaking is structurally suppressed, strategy stops being about creating pass opportunities and becomes about defending against vulnerability. You protect qualifying position, you protect pit exit gaps, and you treat clean air as a resource worth more than raw pace.

What it means for strategy: on DRS-resistant circuits, the fastest car doesn’t always win — but the best weekend usually does. Saturday is disproportionately valuable, and Sunday becomes a track-position exercise with pit timing as the only realistic lever. It’s also where teammate dynamics can matter more than usual, because one car can unintentionally (or very intentionally) become the pace-setting cork that defines everyone else’s options.

Passing zones are strategy zones (and 2025 proved it)

Once you accept that overtaking is circuit-shaped, the strategic questions get cleaner.

On DRS-forward tracks, you plan stints around where you want to be fast: you might accept an early stop to access tyre life for repeated attempts, because you know the circuit will keep giving you braking invitations. On DRS-neutral tracks, you plan around when you can afford to follow closely: you might choose a slightly longer first stint not because the tyre is better, but because the traffic risk is worse and the overtake cost is higher. On DRS-resistant tracks, you plan around not needing to pass at all — because the race is often decided by avoiding the scenario where passing becomes necessary.

This is also the place where the “no fastest lap point” era quietly changes the endgame. Without that bonus from 2025 onward, late-race calls simplify: you’re far less likely to sacrifice track position for a soft-tyre flyer, and far more likely to keep the car on track, in the DRS window, applying pressure that might force an error — or at minimum keeps the opponent defending instead of managing tyres.

If you want to turn this into something actionable, don’t guess — simulate. Race outcomes in 2025 regularly hinged on whether a driver could convert one realistic pass on a DRS-forward circuit, or whether they could avoid needing that pass on a DRS-resistant one. Plug in alternate finishes, pit timing outcomes, or swing positions and see how quickly the title picture moves using RaceMate’s championship points calculator.

The 2025 takeaway: DRS didn’t create overtaking — it revealed the track

The cleanest way to summarise 2025 is this: DRS worked best on circuits that were already built to support passing. Where the circuit supplied straight length, braking depth, and line variety, DRS turned “close” into “through.” Where the circuit didn’t, DRS mostly turned “close” into “stuck.”

And in a season where Norris, Verstappen and Piastri finished within 13 points across the top three, “stuck” wasn’t just a vibe — it was a championship variable. The teams that understood their circuit archetype early (and planned their pit windows, tyre offsets, and traffic exposure around it) didn’t just overtake more cleanly — they needed fewer miracles.

If 2025 taught us anything, it’s that overtaking isn’t a single skill. It’s a relationship between car behaviour in dirty air, tyre life under pressure, and whether the circuit is willing to offer an honest passing zone. DRS can help you cash that opportunity — but it can’t print it out of thin air.